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ABSTRACT
In this research, we wanted to fi nd the 
connec tion between level of trust and 
modernity or traditionalism of gender roles 
in Europe, considering its various cultural 
backgrounds and family traditions. In keeping 
with the hypothesis, the level of trust and 
the modernity of gender and family roles 
varied greatly among the analysed countries. 
In general, the levels of trust and tradition-
alism were correlated within each country.
Our hypothesis regarding the connection 
between modernity and level of trust by 
region was partly proven. Finland, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands showed high levels 
of both trust and modernity. Spain and 
the United Kingdom were in the middle. 
On the other end of the scale, Greece, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary showed tra-
ditional gender roles and low levels of trust. 
In Ukraine, the level of trust was higher 
than expected, but traditional attitudes to 
gender and family roles were rather strong.
The main aim of this analysis was pre-
senting the phenomenon of “familism” 
in Hungary (and other Central-Eastern 
European countries) with the help of empir-
ical data. The analysis of trust in institutions 
and of gender- and family-related attitudes 
can help reach a basic understanding of 
why is there a sharp inconsistency between 
attitudes and actual behavior in Hungary.
INTRODUCTION
The change in family forms in Hungary 
over the past fi fty, and especially the past 
twenty years, has been well documented 
by recent demographic and sociological 
studies (See e.g., Pongrácz, Molnár, and 
Dobossy 2001; Pongrácz and Spéder 2003; 
Spéder 2005; Utasi 2003). Marriage, to 
give an example, has changed from being 
the only acceptable and “normal” way 
to form an intimate partnership to being 
merely one—though still the most typical—
option. Even just two decades ago, in the 
views of most people, cohabitation was 
acceptable only under special conditions 
(e.g., obvious material interest in the case 
of widowed people) and was seen as an 
embodiment of an unsettled, lumpen way 
1The present study is an English translation of the original Hungarian-language study by the authors, published 
in Európai Társadalmak Összehasonlító Vizsgálata (European Social Survey) 7, no. 2 (2008): 63–78. (Published by 
Társadalmi Regiszter, MTA Politikai Tudományok Intézete és MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, Budapest.)
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of life. Marriage at an early age was part 
of the standard(ized) life course that was 
underpinned, at the time, by both material 
interests and social norms.
However, as of today, not only has 
cohabitation become popular among 
young adults in Hungary, but other 
previously unknown family types (such 
as “living apart together,” [occasionally 
multiple] remarriage, and young people 
living without steady partners for long 
periods of time) have also emerged. These 
phenomena have all come to be considered 
social problems by researchers, policymak-
ers, and ordinary Hungarians alike.
Nonetheless, in contrast to the above 
trends, the results of various attitude 
surveys—including domestic and interna-
tional comparative inquiries—all highlight 
the continuing existence of strong family- 
and child-centeredness in Hungary. They 
moreover demonstrate a high public opinion 
regarding marriage. Hence, it appears that the 
majority of Hungarians are struggling with 
the following contradiction: while desiring 
to conform to a family model prevalent in an 
earlier historical era and still viewed as ideal, 
they have, in fact, produced a polychro-
matic (heterogeneous) family typology, just 
like those seen in other similarly developed 
societies at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury. Though it is nothing new to observe an 
inconsistency between attitudes and actual 
behaviors, the extent of this discrepancy in 
present-day Hungary is remarkable indeed. 
Most researchers explain this discrepancy 
with reference to the fi nancial and economic 
conditions of Hungarians and accord-
ingly suggest that demographic behaviors 
could be realigned with prevailing attitudes 
and values by implementing more family-
friendly tax and welfare and employment 
policies. Nonetheless, the same discrepancy 
can be approached from diff erent angles 
too. In a previous article (Tóth and Dupcsik 
2007), we argued that this discrepancy could 
be explained with reference to traditions and 
culture. While real behavior has modernized, 
attitudes and values remain conservative 
because of the presence of “familism” (see 
below) in contemporary Hungarian society. 
The present study aims to help reveal and 
elaborate this phenomenon.
FAMILISM AND TRUST
The analysis put forth in this study 
is based on the concept of familism. 
Familism is a complex, polysemantic 
(multi-vocal) term that features in the 
international literature alternatively as 
familism, familismo, or Familismus. It is 
often translated into Hungarian as “family-
centeredness” (családközpontúság), a term 
that pertains to a value system or system of 
attitudes. This interpretation, however, can 
be misleading, since familism can refer to 
an ideology as well as a social condition.
Familism as an ideology emphasizes the 
outstanding importance of the family and 
family relations for individuals as well as 
society as a whole. On the one hand, the 
family as a social unit in which relations are 
fully based on solidarity and altruism pro-
vides a sort of ideal (though rather unat-
tainable) model for other social institutions. 
On the other hand, family is viewed as the 
most important contributor to the cultiva-
tion of prosocial behavior, social solidarity, 
and the attitudes that come to shape society. 
Those who use familism in this sense regard 
individualism—or to be more precise, ideol-
ogies and behaviors viewed as individualistic 
by the proponents of familism—to exem-
plify an “abnormal” anti-family ideology.
Familism as a social condition seems to 
prevail in societies characterized by low 
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social trust, where family relations are seen 
as the only thing individuals can trust. More 
precisely, familism as a social condition 
does not derive from the intrinsic strength 
of family relations and family-friendly atti-
tudes, but rather from their relative strength 
in a context where other social institutions 
are weak, partial, constrained, and/or 
constantly destabilized by mutual distrust 
between participants. Those who use the 
term familism in this sense often regard it 
as a synonym of  egoism and individualism 
(Fukuyama, 1997). Generally speaking, 
this kind of familism appears where civil 
society is weak and there is a long history 
of state centralization. The most frequently 
mentioned examples of familism in this 
context are southern Italy, France,2 China, 
and more recently the post-communist 
countries (Papp 2000; Torsello 2004).
In the present study, we are looking 
for empirical evidence of whether there 
is an eff ective correlation between social 
distrust and conservatism concerning family 
and gender roles. The ESS (European 
Social Survey) international database 
makes it possible to compare Hungarian 
data with those from other countries in 
the Eastern European region as well as 
other European countries with diff erent 
cultural backgrounds. By conducting such 
comparisons, we aim to prove that beyond 
the existence of familism in terms of actual 
family-centeredness (which we do not discuss 
in the present study), familism that arises from 
a defi cit of social trust also exists in Hungary. 
We wish to show that this latter factor acts 
as a partial driver of the apparently conser-
vative values detected in attitude surveys.
HYPOTHESES
As mentioned above, according to the 
relevant literature, familism and level of 
social trust are interrelated. By utilizing the 
ESS’s second survey dataset, we aim to make 
clear whether it is possible to empirically 
identify the existence of this correlation 
in the case of European countries in 
diff erent regions with various traditions 
and backgrounds. The hypotheses for our 
analysis are the following:
1. The average level of trust in people will 
diff er by country and region. It will be 
highest in the Scandinavian and Western 
European countries, and will be lowest 
in Eastern European countries. In Central 
Europe and the Mediterranean coun-
tries, it will have an in-between value. We 
expect that in the case of Hungary, the 
level of social trust will be close to that for 
the Eastern European region overall—in 
other words, a rather low value.
2. The formation of traditional or mod-
ern attitudes concerning the family and 
gender roles will bear a consistent rela-
tionship with the level of social trust. 
Traditional attitudes concerning family 
roles in Hungary are among the stron-
gest among the investigated countries. 
Consequently, in regional and national 
contexts, social distrust and traditional 
family values go together, just as higher 
trust and modern family conceptions do.
3. It can be pointed out within each coun-
try that people with a low level of trust 
tend to show rather traditional attitudes 
concerning gender roles.
2As Fukuyama (pp. 163–182) argues, the level of family-centredness is not as high in France as in Italy, but the rela-
tive strength of the family and the lack of intermediate organizations between the state and families make France a 
special example of familism.
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ABOUT THE ANALYSIS
In our analysis, we use the ESS’s second 
survey dataset. We select two countries 
from each region in which to test our 
hypotheses: Finland and Sweden from 
the Scandinavian region, Greece and 
Spain from the Mediterranean region, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
from the West European region, Ukraine 
and Poland from the Eastern European 
region, and Hungary and Slovakia from the 
Central European region. Unfortunately, 
no ESS data is available on Italy, although 
the reference literature regards Italy as one 
of the classical example of familism.
Among the ESS variables relevant to 
questions of trust, we focus on data con-
cerning trust in people. It goes without say-
ing that the questions concerning trust in 
institutions are also important, but in this 
study we consider it more vital to investi-
gate the weaknesses and strengths of direct 
human relations. We compare the data con-
cerning trust with those regarding attitudes 
in relation to family and gender roles and 
then investigate the specifi c relationships of 
the two in the aforementioned countries.
TRUST IN PEOPLE: THREE 
QUESTIONS
“General trust in people”  was measured with 
three questions in the ESS questionnaire. The 
variable called “People are decent in general” 
reached the highest average score of the three 
in each country, implying that respondents 
People are trustworthy
People are decent
in general
People are helpful
PL GR SK HU UA ES GB NL SE FI
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
PL GR SK HU UA ES UK NL SE FI
People are 
trustworthy
3.59 3.82 4.02 4.11 4.45 4.89 5.18 5.84 6.05 6.52
People are decent 
in general
4.58 3.68 4.50 4.55 4.79 5.22 5.59 6.24 6.53 6.82
People are helpful 3.18 3.18 3.73 3.99 3.82 4.21 5.64 5.39 5.91 5.71
Figure 1: The average score for “General trust in people” by country (scores from 0 to 10).
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Netherlands
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Finland
Total
Figure 2: Average scores of the aggregated variable “Trust in people” (created from the three 
trust questions) by country.
trust that they will not be deceived by others 
more than they trust in other aspects of 
interpersonal relations. The respondents 
show least trust in people’s readiness to help, 
and the average score for general trust falls in 
between. The distribution of the responses 
in the United Kingdom and Greece diff ers 
from that in the other countries in that the 
British show more trust in people’s readiness 
to help while the Greeks, low in trust overall, 
produce the highest scores for general trust.
TRUST IN PEOPLE: THE 
AGGREGATED VARIABLE OF TRUST
We create an aggregated variable named 
“Trust in people” from the three existing 
variables (questions) by summing their scores. 
The score range of this new variable is 
between 0 and 30. Lower scores indicate lower 
levels of trust, while higher scores express 
higher levels of trust. Figure 2 shows the 
average scores of the ten investigated countries 
according to this new aggregated variable.
Average “Trust in people” scores are very 
diff erent across the investigated countries. 
In accordance with our fi rst hypothesis, we 
fi nd the highest level of trust in the Scan-
dinavian and Western European countries 
(Finland: 19.9, Sweden: 18.6; the Nether-
lands: 17.9). Unpredicted by our hypothesis, 
the two Mediterranean countries showed a 
huge diff erence. While the average score was 
15 in the case of Spain, it was only 11.3 in 
the case of Greece—the lowest score among 
the ten investigated countries. These data 
suggest that Spain has modernized very fast 
in terms of values and attitudes (this can be 
seen in other attitude surveys too, including 
the International Social Survey Program—
ISSP datasets) but we cannot explain the 
diff erence between the two countries. The 
Central and Eastern European countries 
also do not show universal features. For 
instance Ukraine reached a higher score of 
trust (13.7), topping both Hungary (12.8) 
and Slovakia (12.6). This result denies our 
fi rst hypothesis about the monolit structure 
of trust by European regions.
9020TS-JIPS-0101-Toth_Dupcsik.indd   5 2/9/2012   11:50:50 AM
6 Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres • Vol. 1 No. 1 (Month 2011)
Olga Tóth and Csaba Dupcsik
TRUST AND TRADITIONALITY 
CONCERNING FAMILY ROLES: 
THREE QUESTIONS3
Concerning the statement above (that a 
woman should sacrifi ce gainful employment 
on behalf  of the family if  need be), it is not 
yet possible to point out in each country 
the correlation of modern gender and 
family attitudes and a (relatively) high 
level of trust. Our hypothesis regarding 
the correlation of the two, however, can 
be verifi ed in the case of countries such 
as Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, 
which are typically modern according to 
survey responses, as well as in the cases 
of Slovakia, Greece, Spain, and Poland. 
In Hungary, there is no signifi cant cor-
relation between the acceptance of the 
above statement and the level of trust. 
Only in Ukraine is the acceptance of the 
above statement stronger than in Hungary. 
Unsurprisingly, Hungarian respondents 
give less importance to women’s employ-
ment than their engagement in family tasks, 
regardless of the relative level of trust.
The statement in Figure 4 encapsu-
lates the traditional conception that the 
man is the breadwinner and that conse-
quently, in times of economic crisis, men 
must be given priority in the job market. 
The acceptance of this statement is quite 
diff erent in the respective countries under 
study. Most respondents in the Scandi-
navian and Western European countries 
as well in Spain strongly disagree with it. 
Hungary proves to be the most conser-
vative country here, which may refl ect 
the traditional attitudes of Hungarians 
concerning gender roles. The acceptance 
of the assumption that “the male is the 
breadwinner”—with an average score of 
3Scoring of the attitude questions goes from 1 to 5. The higher is the code, the higher is the refusal of the 
statement.
4,003,503,002,502,001,501,000,500,00
UA
HU
PL
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UK
GR
SK
NL
FI
SE
3
2
1
Figure 3: Average scores concerning the statement “Woman should be prepared to cut down 
on paid work for sake of family,” broken down by country and level of trust. (1 = low level of 
trust; 2 = average level of trust; 3 = high level of trust.)
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Figure 4: Average scores concerning the statement “Men should have more right to jobs than 
women do when jobs are scarce,” seen by country and level of trust. (1 = low level of trust; 
2 = average level of trust; 3 = high level of trust.)
approximately 2.5 (indicating a low level 
of modernity with regard to this question, 
as opposed to an average score of about 
4 in Scandinavian countries)—proves to be 
even stronger in Hungary than in the other 
post-communist countries. The correlation 
between traditionalism/modernity and level 
of trust in each country is consistent with 
our hypothesis. People with a high level 
of trust show signifi cantly more modern 
attitudes, in all countries. It is worth not-
ing that the average score of people with 
the highest level of trust in Hungary is 
only slightly higher than the average score 
of people with the lowest level of trust in 
Poland, for example.
The general opinion regarding divorce 
in the case of  couples with children is 
usually more traditional than opinions on 
other issues relating to family and gender 
roles. In each country, respondents more 
or less agree that couples with children 
should attempt to stay together even if  
they do not get along. Concerning this 
question, Hungary proves to be more 
accepting—or more “modern”—than 
is the case with other family-related 
questions. The high number of  divorces in 
Hungary is paralleled by a high acceptance 
of  divorce, showing relative coherence 
between behaviors and attitudes. It is 
known from other comparative surveys 
(e.g., the ISSP) that divorce is a widely 
accepted tool for “solving” family confl icts 
in Hungary. In fact, it has often been 
suggested that couples’ confl ict-resolution 
ability in Hungary is weak in general, and 
thus that they immediately look to divorce 
as the solution whenever a relationship 
goes wrong. (Tóth 1997) Regarding the 
data in Figure 5, one can see a correlation 
between modernity and level of  trust only 
in the case of  countries in the middle range 
(Spain, Slovakia, and Poland). This stands 
in agreement with our third hypothesis. 
In the countries that most strongly 
accept or reject this statement, no kind of 
correlation could be verifi ed.
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CONCLUSIONS
In the present analysis, we investigated 
whether there is a correlation between 
level of social trust and traditionalism or 
modernity of attitudes concerning gender 
roles in various European countries having 
diff erent cultural backgrounds. The countries 
in our analysis manifested diff erent levels 
of trust in a relative order that more or less 
corresponded to our preliminary expectations. 
The modernization of values in the case of 
Spain that can be seen in our data can be 
gleaned from other data too, while Ukraine 
showed a higher level of trust than expected.
Our hypothesis concerning consistency 
between level of trust and traditionalism by 
region was partly verifi ed. Finland, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands showed a high level of 
trust and modern attitudes towards family 
roles. Spain and the United Kingdom 
assumed a position in the middle of the 
scale in terms of both level of trust and 
modernity. Ukraine, in contrast, showed a 
relatively high level of trust alongside rather 
traditional attitudes concerning family roles. 
At the other end of the scale, in Greece, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, low level 
of trust was consistent with a conservative 
attitude towards family roles in general.
Within countries, levels of trust and 
traditionalism were generally interrelated. 
As regards the statement “The male is the 
breadwinner,” this hypothesis was verifi ed 
for each country, while the two other 
hypotheses were verifi ed only in the majority 
of  countries. Peculiarly, level of trust was 
not correlated with modern attitudes in the 
case of extremely conservative countries 
(Hungary and Greece).
The main purpose of this analysis was 
to point out the existence of familism as a 
social condition, primarily in the case of 
Hungary but also in other countries in the 
same region. In any case, there is a need for 
further investigation that draws in other 
variables and applies more complex statis-
tical processes, since the verifi cation of our 
4,003,503,002,502,001,501,000,500,00
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Figure 5: Average scores concerning the statement “If children are in the home, the parents 
should stay together even if they don’t get along,” seen by country and level of trust. (1 = low 
level of trust; 2 = average level of trust; 3 = high level of trust)
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hypotheses was only partially successful. 
The analysis of trust in institutions and of 
other attitudes concerning family and gender 
roles may help us get a better understanding 
of why there is such a huge gap between 
attitudes and real behavior in Hungary.
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